Chapter 1: cooperative concepts
The Shapley value and the Stand Alone core; cost sharing examples.
core stability in simple exchange economies: the Bohm-Bawerk horse market;
house barter and the top trading cycle algorithm; bilateral matching and the
Gale Shapley algorithm.
Chapter 2: two-person zero-sum games
in strategic form; in extensive form;
Mixed strategies and the Von Neuman Theorem; the case of innite games.
Chapter 3: Nash equilibrium
Coordinated scenarios; ineciency and multiplicity of equilibria;
dominance-solvable games; dominant strategy equilibrium;
Dynamic stability: stable and unstable equilibria; strictly dominance solv-
able games; potential games.
Chapter 4: mixed, correlated and Bayesian equilibrium
Nash's theorem; games with increasing best reply;
von Neuman- Morgenstern utility;
mixed and correlated equilibrium;
games of incomplete information.
Chapter 5: extensive form games
subgame perfect equilibrium; the case of innite games;
other renements; sequential rationality; trembling hand perfection.
Homeworks wil l be assigned almost every week; two mid term tests (on Febru-
ary 11th and March 18th) and a final exam.