Economics 440

Advanced Game Theory

Spring 2010

Professor Herve Moulin

Time and place: TTH 9:25-10:40 BB 116
Office: Baker Inst. 270
Communication: Tel: 348 3312; e-mail: moulin
Office hours: T 11:00 am-1:00 pm
Final exam: TBA

Syl labus:

Chapter 1: cooperative concepts
The Shapley value and the Stand Alone core; cost sharing examples.
core stability in simple exchange economies: the Bohm-Bawerk horse market;
house barter and the top trading cycle algorithm; bilateral matching and the
Gale Shapley algorithm.

Chapter 2: two-person zero-sum games
in strategic form; in extensive form;
Mixed strategies and the Von Neuman Theorem; the case of innite games.

Chapter 3: Nash equilibrium
Coordinated scenarios; ineciency and multiplicity of equilibria;
dominance-solvable games; dominant strategy equilibrium;
Dynamic stability: stable and unstable equilibria; strictly dominance solv-
able games; potential games.

Chapter 4: mixed, correlated and Bayesian equilibrium
Nash's theorem; games with increasing best reply;
von Neuman- Morgenstern utility;
mixed and correlated equilibrium;
games of incomplete information.

Chapter 5: extensive form games
subgame perfect equilibrium; the case of innite games;
other renements; sequential rationality; trembling hand perfection.
Homeworks wil l be assigned almost every week; two mid term tests (on Febru-
ary 11th and March 18th) and a final exam.





Updated 01/05/2010