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The distinction between
human and animal is particularly difficult to define, and incidentally
has been a matter of my own personal curiosity since childhood. In kindergarten,
I would ask my Catholic school teachers whether human beings' nature was
animal or otherwise. I had suspected that there was no tangible evidence
that humans were somehow super-animal, and I believed that humans, my
teacher included, were reluctant to accept this. Curiously I recall taking
comfort in the belief that humans and animals are closely related. In
any case, the questions would always be cleverly avoided and are thus
left for me to address here. The Oxford English
Dictionary's first two definitions would offer different answers to an
inquisitive 7-year-old: "1.a. A living being... endowed with life,
sensation and voluntary motion," clearly including human beings,
and "2. In common usage: one of the lower animals... as distinguished
from man," explicitly excluding human beings. I have compiled a
list of criteria which are used in The Island of Dr. Moreau to distinguish
between humans and (other ?) animals. It is as symmetrical a list as I
could make it, although most of the book describes the hybrids, assuming
familiarity with humans. The list is largely what might be expected, however a few items seem to warrant some discussion. The clothing distinction is particularly interesting. As the human-animal distinction is fuzzier than we might be comfortable with, we use clothing as a symbolic measure to separate the two, much like we might use uniforms to distinguish members of teams in sport and war who are otherwise very similar.
At least one Lacanian school of object relations described by Mark Bracher asserts that a subject constructs its identity by adopting and rejecting identity elements which might engender love of the subject in another, or in a generalized "Other" object. This process occurs symmetrically in individual and group levels. The subject thus identifies with various meaning-bearing signifiers which constitute the individual's ego-ideal identity. These identity elements are a strategy to engender love in a love-object, and they symbolically represent one's fitness to be loved. When viewed through this lens, human interaction both microscopically and macroscopically is the result of the "wars" which people and whole societies "wage on other [competing] signifiers." One such signifier would be "human," and Bracher specifically asserts gender and race as perennial examples of such "master signifiers." This school of analysis would suggest that Wells, feeling one of his identity-bearing signifiers threatened, asserts two new ones to take its place. Thus, while the meaning of human, and the border between human and animal is challenged, there are at least two human groups who are closer to the animal than Wells himself is.
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Animal
fear-hunted pain-driven
things
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Human
human figure |
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I have marked with an asterisk* those words and phrases which I have interpreted which may not have appeared in the book. While "cannibalism" is alluded to by taboos in the Law, and by the act of cannibalism occurring in the book, the word "cannibalism" may have been used to describe it. 1. "They were... reverting very rapidly. / Some of them - the pioneers,
I noticed with some surprise, were all females - began to disregard the
injunction of decency."(p. 145) The women thus are the first to "revert"
to their animal ways, and thus are included here. It is a stretch, and
perhaps more a criticism of the English language than a commentary on
Wells' narrative that "Men" was used to describe the Human side. |